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ABSTRACT. It is argued that Niels Bohr ultimately arrived at positivistic
and antirealist-flavored statements because of weaknesses in his initial objective of
accounting for measurement in physical terms. Bohr’s investigative approach faced
a dilemma, the choices being (i) conceptual inconsistency or (ii) taking the classical
realm as primitive. In either case, Bohr’s ‘Complementarity’ does not adequately
explain or account for the emergence of a macroscopic, classical domain from a
microscopic domain described by quantum mechanics. A diagnosis of the basic
problem is offered, and an alternative way forward is indicated.
1. Introduction.
In this volume3, Bai and Stachel [1] offer a rebuttal of arguments by
Beller and Fine [2] that Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics was posi-
tivist. That discussion addresses Bohr’s reply [3] to the Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen (‘EPR’) paper [4] . The purpose of the present paper is not to
enter into the specific debate concerning whether Bohr’s basic approach was
positivist or not (although this author tends to agree with Bai and Stachel
that Bohr’s interpretive intentions were not antirealist.) Rather, the intent
is to argue that Bohr inevitably lapsed into antirealist-flavored statements
about quantum systems because his notion of “Complementarity” cannot
consistently account for the emergence of classicality from the quantum level.
It is argued that ultimately this problem arises from Bohr’s implicit assump-
tion that all quantum evolution is unitary; i.e., that there is no real, physical
non-unitary collapse.
It should be noted that Bohr’s ideas changed and evolved over several
decades and this paper does not attempt to trace the intricate development of
this evolution. Rather, attention is focused on Bohr’s initial reply to EPR and
on certain methodological and metaphysical constraints that, it is argued, led
inexorably to a final antirealist position toward quantum level, as evidenced
in his famous statement “There is no quantum world. There is only an
abstract quantum mechanical description.” [7] While a reader might disagree
with whether Bohr was instrumentalist or antirealist at any particular stage
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2rkastner@umd.edu
3Quantum Structural Studies, eds. R.E. Kastner, J. Jeknic´-Dugic´, G. Jaroszkiewicz,
World Scientific Publishers, forthcoming.
1
of the development of his thought, the point of this paper is to argue that the
end result of Bohr’s investigations into the problem was a form of antirealism
about the quantum level that is not in fact forced on us but arises from certain
unacknowledged metaphysical, theoretical and methodological assumptions
which acted as unnecessary constraints on his interpretive investigation (and
which continue to constrain such investigations today).
2. Bohr’s initial arguments.
It should first be noted that the original EPR experiment involving posi-
tion and momentum has some significant differences from the more commonly
discussed later version due to Bohm, the latter based on a spin- 1/2 singlet
state. In the former case, measuring one observable involves a coupling with
its complementary quantity, while that is not the case with the latter spin
experiment. In the spin case, however, it can still be argued that the mea-
surement conditions suitable for one spin observable are incompatible with
measurements of a non-commuting spin observable.
With that in mind, let us attempt to distill Bohr’s much-analyzed reply
to EPR down to its essence. First, consider his discussion of measurement
of a single quantum system S’s position or momentum using a diaphragm
D (screen with a single slit in it). The basic thought experiment can be
described as follows:
1. Assume that S has an initial well-defined longitudinal momentum
p , with zero transverse component (corresponding to the plane of the di-
aphragm), as it approaches the diaphragm D with slit.
2. Note that upon exiting D, S’s state is one with greatly decreased
transverse position uncertainty ∆q and correspondingly increased transverse
momentum uncertainty ∆p.
3. Ask whether one could ‘foil’ the uncertainty relation by taking into
account any exchange of momentum between S and D in order to reduce the
uncertainty ∆p.
4. Assert that this is impossible because the exchange of momentum is
‘uncontrollable.’
Regarding (4), Dickson [5] notes that the characterization of the exchange
of momentum as ‘uncontrollable’ is basically “an article of faith” on Bohr’s
part, and suggests that one should more conservatively call the momentum
exchange ‘unpredictable.’
What remains ill-defined in Bohr’s account is whether the uncertainties
and unpredictabilities in the measurement processes are to be understood as
genuine ontological indeterminacies or merely epistemic ignorance of determi-
nate values. This, I suggest, is a crucial equivocation in Bohr’s treatment of
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the problem. When dealing with objects that are decidedly quantum systems
(such as the particle S going through the slit), he seems to allow (at least
implicitly, at this stage) these incompatible properties to be fundamentally
indeterminate. On the other hand, when dealing with macroscopic systems,
he uses epistemic language, referring to the relevant interactions and prop-
erties as ‘uncontrollable,’ ‘inaccessible,’ ‘unpredictable,’ etc. This is so even
when he argues that under certain circumstances even a macroscopic object
such as D should be considered one of the quantum ‘objects of study.’ Such
a circumstance would apply, for example, to his proposal to delay the final
measurement of D’s displacement after passage of S and leave it as a matter
of ‘free choice’ – thus treating S and D as quantum-entangled in the EPR
sense.
Of course, this equivocation concerning the nature of uncertainty (onto-
logical vs. epistemic) serves to evade the undesirable result that a macro-
scopic object like D could have a genuinely indeterminate position; if one pur-
sues that line avenue of inquiry, we are led immediately to the Schro¨dinger
Cat paradox (more on that in the next section). One might argue that,
even if taken as ontologically indeterminate, under the discussed thought-
experiment the indeterminacy of D’s displacement would be so tiny as to
be effectively microscopic and therefore not observable. But one could, at
least in principle, reversibly amplify the displacement of D to macroscopic
proportions, in which case D would be in many places at once. Bohr clearly
does not accept this idea; thus he must take position uncertainty pertaining
to D as epistemic.
With regards to statement (3) above, Bohr notes that what makes step
(2) a position measurement is that D is anchored immovably to the lab frame,
which establishes a spacetime frame of reference. Without that spacetime
frame, the notion of a position value would be ill-defined even in a classical
sense. This however is yet another form of equivocation on Bohr’s part. As
Dickson further points out, “there is nothing that, quantum mechanically,
can really serve to define a reference frame, because reference frames are (by
definition!) well-defined both in position and momentum. Quantum theory
tells us that there is no such thing, but for the sake of making our notions of
position and momentum meaningful, we voluntarily choose to accept a given
physical object (the apparatus, or whatever) to serve as a reference frame.”
( [5] p.14, my emphasis)
Here we encounter a form of the dilemma faced by Bohr and, I hope to
persuade the reader, ultimately not resolved by his notion of Complementar-
ity. Our world of experience is clearly classical in that we can legitimately
consider our lab and macroscopic measuring instruments as inhabiting a well-
defined inertial frame. But these are the very phenomena that cry out for
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explanation in view of that fact that the microscopic quantum objects upon
which we experiment, according to the theory describing them, do not inhabit
well-defined reference frames. (This seemingly paradoxical situation actually
is amenable to resolution, which is the subject of Section 4.) Bohr deals with
these apparently disparate realms by equivocation concerning their physical
nature, and that equivocation is aided by his use of qualitative description
rather than quantitative application of the relevant theoretical formalism.
The next section aims to remedy this reliance on qualitative description in
order to more clearly identify the underlying weaknesses in Bohr’s account.
3. Analysis of Bohr’s second thought experiment
Suppose we apply the quantum formalism to Bohr’s thought experiment
of the second case considered; i.e., the case in which D is allowed a trans-
verse degree of freedom in order to have the possibility of measuring the
momentum of S. (This is termed experiment A-2 by Bai and Stachel.) This
is to be done via momentum conservation by measuring D’s momentum be-
fore and after passage of S. But according to Bohr, this leaves us with the
‘free choice’ whether or not to measure position instead of momentum, by
choosing whether or to make a final position or momentum measurement of
D. Thus Bohr seems to be describing the interaction between S and D as
a non-disturbing ‘measurement of the first kind,’ sometimes termed a ‘pre-
measurement’. The initial state of S is |p〉, a state of well-defined momentum
with zero transverse component, and and D is in a ready state of well-defined
position |Q〉. After their interaction, Bohr seems to assume that they can
be represented by an entangled state |Ψ〉 (much like the original EPR state,
as noted by Bai and Stachel). As observed by EPR, such a state has an
inherent basis ambiguity and can be written in terms of any orthogonal set
of states. For reference, equations (7) and (8) of the original EPR paper are
reproduced here:
Ψ(x1, x2) = Σnψn(x2)un(x1) (1)
where Ψ(x1, x2) is a two-particle wave function expressed in terms of eigen-
functions un(x1), of some observable A; and the coefficients ψn(x2) are viewed
as amplitudes for the expansion in this basis.
On the other hand, as EPR note, the same two-particle state can be
expressed in terms of a different set of eigenfunctions vn corresponding to a
different observable B, with different expansion coefficients:
Ψ(x1, x2) = Σnφn(x2)vn(x1) (2)
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Let us define EPR’s first observable A as applying to relevant aspects of
the position of D. For convenience, take the eigenstates to be a discrete set of
small transverse position ranges |Qi〉 (one of which would act as a pointer to
the localized wave packet |qk〉 emerging from the slit). The second observable
B will apply to the transverse momentum of D and its eigenstates will be a
discrete set of small transverse momentum ranges |Pj〉 (which would act as
a pointer to the transverse momentum state |pj〉 of the emerging particle).
The corresponding discrete states for S will be |qi〉 and |pj〉 respectively. So
|Ψ〉 will look like:
|Ψ〉 ∼ Σiαi|qi〉|Qi〉 = Σjβj|pj〉|Pj〉 (3)
where αi and βi are amplitudes. Thus, if we choose to measure the final
position Q of D and find it within the range Qk, then the ‘entire experimental
arrangement’ allows us to attribute to S the corresponding state |qk〉; or if
we measure the final momentum P of D and find it within the range Pn, then
similarly in virtue of Bohr’s ‘wholeness’ criterion, we can attribute to S the
corresponding state |pn〉.
Now, presumably the designated unitary evolution of the initially inde-
pendent systems to the above entangled state would have to be treated as a
correlation arising via scattering of the particle from the edges of the slit in
D. To get some feel for the magnitudes involved, assume an incoming electron
energy of roughly 20 Mev, and a mass for D of as little as 1 gram (small but
still macroscopic), in an elastic scattering process. The maximum possible
outgoing velocity for D would be negligible: of the order of 10−17 m/s. This
is good and bad news for Bohr. The good news is that such a microscopic
effect might make it seem reasonable to consider S and D as two entangled
quantum systems (D being on the same footing as S as an ‘object of study’).
But the bad news is that D could not serve as a credible measuring instru-
ment for the momentum of S, and therefore we would not really have a ‘free
choice’ at this point to make that measurement given the putative entangled
system as described. In order to accomplish the latter, and still provide the
“free choice” that Bohr asserts, D would need to be entangled with some sort
of amplifying degree of freedom. But in that case, we have a Schro¨dinger’s
Cat situation: any indeterminacy in either D’s position or momentum would
be visible at the macroscopic level, but it never is.
Thus, we can see that this is just the usual problem in which macroscopic
objects, when assumed to be described by quantum states entangled with
quantum systems, become ‘infected’ with any indeterminacy pertaining to
the quantum system. That is, it is the measurement problem. As Dickson
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notes: “Presumably, to consider the interaction between [the particle] and
the apparatus a genuine measurement we must ignore the subsequent en-
tanglement between them and take the apparatus to be in a definite state of
indication, even if in fact it is not.” ( [5] p. 28, preprint version.) This incon-
sistency problem is not addressed by the notion of Complementarity. That
is, it is fine to note that certain observables are incompatible and cannot be
simultaneously measured, and that it may be inappropriate to regard values
of such sets of observables as all well-defined under specified circumstances.
But since such an observation does not resolve the above consistency issue,
it would appear to amount to little more than just restating the uncertainty
principle. “Complementarity” is not enough.
4. Bohr’s epistemological and methodological assumptions as un-
necessary restrictions on his investigation
At this point we consider some methodological and epistemological pro-
nouncements by Bohr, which represent the constraints under which his in-
vestigation took place, but which can in fact be questioned. It should first be
noted that the often-emphatic nature of Bohr’s assertions may be understood
as a legitimate response to the need to question the classical, mechanistic,
reductionist thinking prevailing at the time. That is, Bohr was correct to
emphasize that quantum theory represented a wholly new type of epistemo-
logical and ontological challenge for the practice of physics as it had been
traditionally understood; however, he himself was also operating under cer-
tain preconceptions. Thus, although one can understand the categorical and
emphatic tone of some of his statements in the historical and philosophi-
cal context in which he was working, one must also approach his assertions
critically, not regarding them as the last word on the subject.
Consider now this rather lengthy categorical assertion:
“The essential lesson of the analysis of measurements in quantum theory is thus
the emphasis on the necessity, in the account of the phenomena, of taking the whole
experimental arrangement into consideration, in complete conformity with the fact
that all unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves
the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system
concerned and the character of the possible predictions as regards subsequent observ-
able properties of that system. Any measurement in quantum theory can in fact only
refer either to a fixation of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it is
first the combination of measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined
phenomenon.” [11]
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One can make the above assertion considerably less lengthy. Omitting
some of the categorical and emphatic aspects, the basic claims are found to
be:
1. Measurement in quantum theory can only be physically defined by
reference to a macroscopic experimental arrangement.
2. A well-defined phenomenon, taken as defining ‘measurement,’ requires
an initial preparation and final (macroscopic) observation.
3. There is no unambiguous interpretation of the quantum formalism
as applied to any system without reference to externally fixed conditions
defining the initial and final states of that system, where ‘externally fixed
conditions’ means macroscopic phenomena accessible to an observer.
In what follows, I critique these claims. A refutation of all three is pre-
sented in the final section, through a counterexample: a formulation that un-
ambiguously specifies how the determinacy inherent in measurement arises
without necessary reference to macroscopic phenomena.
Firstly, while Bohr’s insistence on the “necessity... of taking the whole
experimental arrangement into consideration” is well known, and is often
taken as a benign statement of ‘quantum wholeness,’ it is actually a very
strong (and, I will argue, unnecessary) prohibition on taking any degree of
freedom as physically specifiable independently of macroscopic phenomena.
This prohibition is sharpened in claim 3 which effectively asserts that one is
not allowed to say that the quantum formalism, as applied to any subsystem
of an ‘entire experimental arrangement,’ has an unambiguous physical refer-
ent, even if one cannot describe that referent in “ordinary”– meaning classical
– terms. Note that this is a stronger claim than merely saying “an unmea-
sured subsystem does not have classically observable properties”; rather, it
says that one should not try to understand the physical nature of any degrees
of freedom that are correctly assigned a quantum theoretical description.
Overall, Bohr’s quoted statement assumes that unambiguous physics only
obtains in the context of a ‘measurement,’ where that term is considered to
be definable only in terms of a macroscopic experimental arrangement lead-
ing to an ‘observation’ or ‘phenomenon’. This use of the term ‘measurement’
is a conflation, ongoing in much of the literature, of two distinct ideas: (i)
the intervention of an observer whose intent is to gain determinate knowledge
about something under study; and (ii) the existence of a fact of the matter –
or determinate a value of some property – whether or not anyone has intent to
discover it (or whether or not it results from a macroscopic ‘phenomenon’).
The preceding two different notions of the determinacy obtaining in mea-
surement (but not necessarily confined to a knowledge-gathering measuring
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operation) can be labeled as (i) epistemic and (ii) ontological, respectively.
Bohr’s pronouncement of course denies (ii) by asserting that it is only through
an in-principle macroscopic ‘phenomenon’ that any physical quantity is well-
defined, and that the quantum formalism is not even interpretable outside
that condition. But this denial can and will be questioned.
Besides the above conflation, Bohr’s insistence that one must take “the
whole experimental arrangement into account” does not remedy the consis-
tency problem concerning S and D in their purported entanglement that he
describes in his reply to EPR. One supposedly has a “free choice” whether to
measure the momentum of D and thereby gain knowledge of the momentum
of S on passing through the slit, or to measure the position of D and thereby
gain knowledge of the position of S. In this case S and D are in an entangled
pure state and D and S are described by improper mixed states. There is
no basis from within the theory to say why, at the time when the choice is
supposedly available, any uncertainty pertaining to D should be of a different
sort than that pertaining to S. Yet clearly Bohr needs D’s uncertainty to be
epistemic rather than ontic in nature to avoid a Schro¨dinger’s Cat situation;
while on the other hand, since he views any attributes of a quantum system
such as S in need of (at least) irreversible amplification [10] in order to be
considered determinate, the uncertainty pertaining to S cannot be considered
epistemic. However, the theoretical description provides no justification for
attributing different sorts of uncertainties to S and D.
Ultimately, Bohr’s response to this conundrum is to deny reality to quan-
tum objects, and to assert by fiat that at some point in the (assumed as
linear) evolution, a determinate world of experience occurs and classical ‘re-
ality’ begins – since we routinely see objects like D with determinate po-
sition and momentum. This is not an explanation of classical emergence,
but rather an equivocation concerning the application of quantum theory.
A crude analogy is that the unitary quantum evolution is like a car engine
engaged via the clutch with the gear shaft (which carries the entanglement of
the relevant degrees of freedom); but at the point in which we find ourselves
empirically describing objects that are classically determinate (or, in which
the dimensions of the experiment are much larger than Planck’s constant),
we disengage the clutch. This is an ad hoc move; there is no consistent the-
oretical account for suspension of the unitary evolution. (It will not do to
reply, in Bohrian fashion, that “the lesson of quantum theory is that there
can be no consistent theoretical account,” since one is provided in the final
section.)
However, could we see this sort of move as justified by seeing it as form of
pragmatism? I think the answer is negative, and arguably does a disservice
to pragmatism. Pragmatism primarily concerned itself with reforming the
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concept of truth from an abstract and absolute notion to a concrete and func-
tional one. It is one thing to say that our criteria for truth must require that
truth claims pass some test of functionality; it is quite another to suspend
the quantum formalism to force the theoretical description to correspond to
our empirical experience and/or to classical mechanics at a specified limit,
even though it apparently does not. That is the essence of equivocation, and
pragmatism was not equivocal.
It is worth mentioning in this context that Bub [8] has given an inter-
esting formal account of Bohr’s “Complementarity.” Bub has shown that
the Hilbert space structure of quantum states allows for a generalization of
the “Bohmian” theory in which the position of a quantum system is taken
as an always-determinate “beable” (Bell’s term, [9]). It turns out that one
can always choose one particular observable as having preferred status, such
that its eigenvalues attain “beable” status; and any other observable com-
muting with that preferred observable will have determinate values as well.
Meanwhile, properties corresponding to observables not commuting with the
preferred observable have indeterminate status (there are no yes/no answers
to questions about those properties, where the questions are represented by
projection operators on the Hilbert Space). According to Bub’s observation,
Complementarity consists of conferring “preferred” status on the observable
selected as being determinate by the ‘entire experimental arrangement,’ such
that its eigenvalues become “beables.”
Does this allow Bohr to escape from the above inconsistency problem?
I believe the answer is “no”. Recall that Bohr says we have a free choice
whether to measure position or momentum of the diaphragm in the case
in which S and D are assumed to be entangled; he asserts that D is to
be viewed as a quantum system at this stage of the experiment. Clearly
the availability of this “free choice” means that we have not yet completed
the “entire experimental arrangement” that would bring about a preferred
observable according to Bub’s formulation. But this means that (at this stage
of the experiment, prior to the choice), there is no fact of the matter about
either D’s position or its momentum, since neither is a preferred observable.
Thus invoking a preferred observable-based beable does not rescue Bohr from
the inconsistency, since his “entire experimental arrangement” criterion for
the preferred observable implies the undesirable conclusion that at certain
preliminary stages of an experiment, a macroscopic object has no determinate
physical property. It should be kept in mind that the tiny displacement of D
does not help here: according to Bohr’s assumptions, in principle one could
reversibly entangle another degree of freedom with D that would amplify
the tiny displacement to macroscopic proportions and yet still be described,
according to Bohr, as a quantum system (since there has been no “irreversible
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amplification” such as a change in the chemical properties of photographic
plate emulsion that Bohr takes as heralding a “measurement”).
As noted in the Introduction, Bohr’s views evolved over time. For exam-
ple, as Stachel points out, “Bohr’s later approach places primary emphasis
on four-dimensional processes; from this point of view, a ‘state’ is just a par-
ticular spatial cross-section of a process, of secondary importance: all such
cross-sections are equally valid, and any such sequence of states merely rep-
resents a different ‘perspective’ on the same process.” ([12], p. 1, preprint
version.) It should however be noted that such an approach – dissolving the
measurement problem by noting that some outcome always in fact obtains at
the phenomenal, classical, spacetime level – amounts to an epistemic inter-
pretation of the quantum state. That is, the quantum state and its unitary
evolution are taken as describing only our limited perspective on a process
that is assumed to be complete as an element of a classically determinate
block world. In this approach, the classical world of phenomenal experience
does not emerge from the quantum level. It is taken as ontologically given
and primary, with quantum theory relegated to a partial and perspectival
description of that classical reality.4
In addition to the pronouncement which opened this section, Bohr made
many other emphatic, categorical statements concerning the interpretation
of quantum theory that are nevertheless subject to challenge as being based
on (a) unacknowledged metaphysical and conceptual premises, or (b) even
on an ill-defined ontology. An example of (a) is the following:
“It must not be forgotten that only the classical ideas of material particles and
electromagnetic waves have a field of unambiguous application, whereas the concepts
of photons and electron waves have not. Their applicability is essentially limited to
4Stachel (private communication) gives another argument for denying ontological real-
ity to the quantum state. This consists in the observation that a time-symmetric approach
to the Born Rule will attribute a different state to the same system depending on whether
it is considered a pre-selected or post-selected. In terms of the Aharonov-Bergmann-
Lebowitz rule [13], this is seen in the fact that the ABL rule gives a probability of unity
for an intermediate measurement of either the pre- or post-selected state. But what this
implies for interpretation of the quantum state depends crucially on one’s presumed on-
tology. If one presumes that there is a block world (i.e. no ontological difference between
past, present, and future), then the foregoing results simply restate that ontology, since in
a block world each system is both prepared and fated at any intermediate time during its
lifetime. On the other hand, in a growing universe ontology with indeterminate future, the
foregoing results do not indicate any inconsistency for an ontological quantum state. The
prepared state can be understood as describing the system prior to its detection, while the
attribution of the post-selected state is only applicable a posteriori. (This is essentially
the case for the interpretation to be discussed in the final section.)
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cases in which, on account of the existence of the quantum of action, it is not possible
to consider the phenomena observed as independent of the apparatus utilized for their
observation. I would like to mention, as an example, the most conspicuous application
of Maxwell’s ideas, namely, the electromagnetic waves in wireless transmission. It is a
purely formal matter to say that these waves consist of photons, since the conditions
under which we control the emission and the reception of the radio waves preclude the
possibility of determining the number of photons they should contain. In such a case
we may say that all trace of the photon idea, which is essentially one of enumeration
of elementary processes, has completely disappeared.” [14], 691-92.
The phrase “electromagnetic waves in wireless transmission” means the
classical electromagnetic field. Such a field is instantiated by the quantum
coherent state, which is a superposition of photon number. To obtain a de-
tectable classical field, one needs a very large average photon number.5 Note
that Bohr has slid from the fact that the coherent state is a quantum su-
perposition of photon number to the conclusion that “the photon idea has
disappeared”. But it has not: the coherent state can be understood as a
well-defined physical quantity, whether or not that it is visualizable “in the
ordinary (classical) sense”. [14], p.21. He thus simply disallows an ontology
in which there could be a physically real state of the field, involving an in-
determinate number of photons, that is not visualizable in a classical way.
But, as Ernest McMullin has noted, “[I]maginability must not be made the
test for ontology. The realist claim is that the scientist is discovering the
structures of the world; it is not required in addition that these structures be
imaginable in the categories of the macroworld.” [16],14. In contrast, Bohr
routinely insisted on the latter condition as a basic methodological require-
ment for doing physics. Moreover, that condition is precisely his criterion
for what is to be regarded as physically real: according to Bohr, what is
not “visualizable in the usual (classical) way” is deemed “abstract” and even
“undefined,” as we will see further below in considering an example of (b)
(an ill-defined ontology).
Thus, Bohr’s assertion peremptorily rules out even the possibility of an
unambiguous physical referent for the key theoretical objects of quantum
theory – discrete quanta and de Broglie waves. Yet it is dependent on the
implicit and unnecessary assumption that all real physical processes must
be classically visualizable spacetime processes, and on the accompanying
assumption that quantum discreteness can only mean spacetime localizability
5Sakurai notes that “The classical limit of the quantum theory of radiation is achieved
when the number of photons becomes so large that the occupation number may as well
be regarded as a continuous variable.” ([15], p. 36)
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as a ‘corpuscle’.
The statement was made in the context of Bohr’s inability to reconcile
the idea of a wavelike frequency with the presumed corpuscular idea of a
‘photon’, and the inverse problem of specifying within spacetime any wave-
like (extended) nature of a ‘material particle’ such as an electron. But Bohr’s
negative conclusion is not forced on us: a quantum of electromagnetic radi-
ation or ‘photon’, as the singular entity heralding a quantum discontinuity,
need not be considered as a spatially localized object. The quantized, in-
divisible aspect of the photon can be reinterpreted as a component of the
process of emergence of spacetime events and their discrete connections, the
photon being the latter. Thus the discrete photon can be understood as
emerging under certain suitable physical conditions, and the coherent state
discussed above can be understood as a pre-emergent form of the underlying
field. Meanwhile, the wavelike character of the photon and other material
quanta (i.e. the de Broglie oscillation) can be retained on a sub-empirical,
pre-spacetime level.
Such an approach, in which quantum processes are precursors to the emer-
gence of localized spacetime events and their connections, is briefly reviewed
in the final section. (It should also be noted that the present author is not
the only one currently exploring spacetime emergence; cf. Sorkin [17], Oriti
[18].) Thus, with a suitable relaxing of conceptual barriers and unnecessary
metaphysical presumptions, one can indeed gain an unambiguous applica-
tion for the basic physical concepts of quantum theory, contrary to Bohm’s
categorical negative claim.
An example of (b), a statement from Bohr exhibiting an ill-defined on-
tology is:
“Isolated material particles are abstractions, their properties being definable and ob-
servable only through their interaction with other systems.” [19]
This statement is problematic in several ways. First, many abstractions
are perfectly well defined (such as mathematical concepts); so lack of def-
inition has nothing to do with whether or not something is abstract. But
more importantly, how does a non-physical, allegedly undefined abstraction
undergo physical interactions? And if the interactions are not physical, how
does a process that could be deemed concrete and physical come out of any
of that? This is essentially the same “remove the clutch” inconsistency en-
countered above, where Bohr describes the initial degrees of freedom (S and
D) by an entangled state and its unitary evolution, but then assumes that
something real and determinate (somehow) occurs so that at least one of the
same degrees of freedom (D) is no longer described by the entangled quantum
state and its unitary evolution. There is a gap between the allegedly ‘ab-
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stract and ill-defined’ and the allegedly ‘non-abstract and well-defined’ that
is not bridged by any amount of ‘amplification.’ This problem can be seen as
the same type of metaphysical inconsistency facing Cartesian mind-matter
dualism in that one has two fundamentally different substances that have no
way to ‘interact.’
In an epistemic approach to the quantum state, Bohr could finesse the
inconsistencies described above by saying that we can suspend unitary evo-
lution when it is no longer useful because we now have access to information
that we lacked previously. Thus, neither the quantum state nor its unitary
evolution ever directly described objects that physically existed. All that
exists is the phenomenal, classical level of experience. But again, this leads
Bohr to his ultimately antirealist view of quantum entities; i.e., to his utter-
ance that “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum
mechanical description.” If there is no quantum world, then we need not give
any account of classical emergence from such a world, since all that exists is
the classical world of experience.
Bohr can thus retain a kind of consistency, but only (at least it seems
to this author) at a rather high cost. Bohr spent the bulk of his career de-
veloping a detailed and revolutionary theory of the hydrogen atom in terms
of its applicable quantum states. In order to retain consistency in the face
of reconciling quantum mechanics with the classical realm of experience un-
der the assumption of unitary-only evolution, Bohr ultimately felt forced to
deny that hydrogen atoms could count as real physical referents for the very
quantum states that he helped to formulate for them. Perhaps this turn
to antirealism about the constructs of his pioneering theory was not really
necessary. We consider an alternative in the next and final section.
Before turning to that alternative, it should be noted that Bohr’s formu-
lation legitimately takes measurement and determinacy as contextual; but
it goes further than that by presuming that the contextuality is necessar-
ily always a macroscopic one, dependent on a “phenomenon.” The latter
term essentially means “appearance,” and thus is an intrinsically observer-
dependent notion (since any appearance is always relative to a perceiving
subject or subjects). This is a symptom of the fact that Bohr is unable to
say why only one outcome occurs if one applies linear evolution to a quantum
system and all its correlates; that of course always leads to a Schro¨dinger’s
Cat situation. So Bohr instead assumes that one must start with the ob-
server’s experience, where only one outcome is perceived; then one at least
apparently has a well-defined physical situation.
But it is not in fact the case that this is the only way to obtain a
well-defined physical quantity, and therefore it is not necessary to appeal
to macroscopic ‘phenomena’ as an ostensibly necessary starting point. The
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fundamental unnecessary constraint on Bohr’s thinking is the presumption
that the condition giving rise to a determinate value of a quantum mechan-
ical operator cannot be defined from within the quantum formalism alone.
But in fact it can.
4. Beyond Complementarity.
The above-discussed apparent discrepancy between theory and observa-
tion, to which Bohr’s Complementarity and its attendant antirealism about
quantum objects is sometimes taken as a perplexing but inescapable response,
is not a necessary one. The problem arises from demanding that all interac-
tions between physical degrees of freedom are unitary ones. This is the key
assumption that leads to the measurement problem and the “shifty split”
between the quantum and classical realms, expressed in the ad hoc suspen-
sion of the unitary evolution and quantum-entangled state when it obviously
no longer correctly describes the situation at hand. If nature in fact involves
real non-unitary processes of a well-defined sort – including the circumstances
that give rise to them – then the chain of unitary correlations is broken, and
real physical collapse occurs, resulting in determinacy. Thus, the present
author suggests that what Bohr needs to avoid the dilemma of theoretical
inconsistency on the one hand, and antirealism about quanta on the other,
is genuine, non-unitary physical collapse.
What is also needed is an expansion of our metaphysical notions con-
cerning what qualifies as ‘physically real’ – specifically, the acknowledgment
that there may be real entities, referred to by the theoretical constructs such
as quantum states, that are not be confined to 3+1 spacetime. Thus the
present proposal differs with the “primitive ontology” (PO) approach dis-
cussed by Allori [20]: the starting point for the PO is the assumption that
any fundamental ontology referred to by a theoretical construct must be an
element of the spacetime manifold. This restriction under PO of the “prim-
itive variables” to 3+1 spacetime is prompted by the following consideration:
“Roughly, the three-dimensionality of the primitive variables allows for a direct
contact between the variables in the theory and the objects in the world we want
them to describe. In fact, a PO represented by an object in a space of dimension d,
different than 3, would imply that matter lives in a d-dimensional space. Thus, our
fundamental physical theory would have to be able to provide an additional explana-
tion of why we think we live in three-dimensional world while we actually do not.” [20]
The proposed solution to this challenge is that quantum states refer to
sub-empirical, pre-spacetime entities that can constitute precursors to ob-
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servable spacetime events.6 That is, the ontology has distinct levels: (i)
actuality (observable, element of the spacetime manifold) versus (ii) phys-
ical possibility (still real but unobservable, pre-spatiotemporal). Level (ii)
is essentially the Heisenbergian “potentiae” [22]. Such an ontology, to be
described in more detail below, is consistent with the reasonable view that
real entities should be capable of leading to observable results, even if they
themselves are not observable. In fact the latter view is attributed to Bohr
by Bai and Stachel, who say : “[Bohr’s] (and Einstein’s) view is that what
exists must be measurable, or more accurately, must have measurable conse-
quences.”[1] However, despite this apparent initial openness to allowing phys-
ical existence to non-classical, unobservable entities, Bohr steadily evolved
toward a form of antirealism that denied reality to objects not in-principle
capable of a classical description, i.e. “which cannot be visualized in the
ordinary sense”, as his above-quoted assertions clearly demonstrate.
Returning now to the need for real collapse: there are ‘spontaneous col-
lapse’ models out there, the best known being that of Ghirardi, Rimini, and
Weber [23]; but these involve changing the Schro¨dinger equation (by adding
non-linear terms designed to bring about dynamical collapse). The model
that does not modify the basic quantum evolution (although it incorporates
an additional step resulting in collapse) is based on the direct-action theory
of fields, called the Transactional Interpretation (TI) [21, 24]. TI defines the
usual retarded solution to the Schro¨dinger equation as an ‘offer wave’ (OW).
But it also includes an additional process beyond the unitary evolution of
the offer wave, namely an advanced response from absorbers. The advanced
response, called a ‘confirmation wave’ (CW), is a solution to the complex
conjugate Schro¨dinger Equation. This response is what precipitates collapse
by breaking the linearity of the evolution of the quantum state (OW).
In general, one OW will elicit responses from many absorbers, where
each such absorber receives only a component of the original OW. (A typical
example of this is an interferometer experiment in which a beam splitter
directs OW components to different detectors.) The process of CW response
to OW components corresponds to the von Neuman ‘Process 1’ measurement
transition from a pure state (the OW) to a mixed state (weighted projection
6The question of why the observable spacetime manifold is 3+1 dimensions is a deep
one with many different proposed answers. One relevant fact is that photons, which
create observability, have 4 polarization directions. But for our purposes, it is sufficient
to note that observable processes are always spacetime phenomena, while intrinsically
unobservable quantum processes need not be required to inhabit the same manifold as the
observable ones, as long as an account can be given of the transition from one manifold to
the other. This is indicated in Kastner 2012 [ 21] and later in this section; the transition
is precisely the collapse process.
15
operators corresponding to the different OW components and their respective
CW responses). As discussed in [21], §3.2.3, this mixed state represents
a set of incipient transactions, only one of which can be actualized. It is
proposed that the “collapse” to one outcome among the many (now in a
well-defined basis due to the inclusion of absorber response) occurs through
an analog of symmetry breaking, which is ubiquitous in physics (cf. [25])
The actualization of the transaction constitutes a transfer of measurable
conserved quantities (energy, momentum, spin, etc.) from the emitter to
the ‘winning’ absorber. In the transactional picture, a photon is just this
transfer of in-principle detectable electromagnetic energy, momentum, and
angular momentum; and it is a discrete quantity where the energy E = hν.
Thus, there is a real physical, nonunitary collapse in this model. There is also
a clear physical referent for the “photon” concept independently of whether
any macroscopic, observable “phenomenon” (involving an observer) results
from it.
TI has been extended by this author to the relativistic domain, together
with an ontological reinterpretation of the OW and CW as pre-spatiotemporal
physical possibilities (reminiscent of Heisenbergian ‘potentiae’ as noted above).
This version is called the ‘Possibilist Transactional Interpretation’ (PTI) [21].
In this picture, the collapse is not a spacetime process (which is already
known to be problematic [26]); rather, it is a discontinuous process by which
spacetime events (actualities) emerge from a quantum level of potentiality.
The current paper focuses on Bohr’s views, and will not present a detailed
case for TI or PTI (that has been presented in [21], and also in [27]). The
point is just to note that Bohr’s conclusions are not inevitable, since they
are based on certain methodological and metaphysical assumptions and con-
straints that need not be accepted; and that they do contain gaps and equiv-
ocations, which can in principle be remedied in an appropriate non-unitary
collapse model of measurement.
However, in view of Bohr’s rejection of the quantum coherent state as a
purely “formal” construct in which the “idea of the photon is lost,” it should
be pointed out that [21], Chapter 6 discusses the physical relationship be-
tween the coherent state and the classical electromagnetic field that emerges
from it through sustained actualized transactions. In this context, the term
‘photon’ can also refer to the offer wave capable of transferring one quantum
of electromagnetic energy, and a coherent state is just an offer wave that is
capable of transferring a varying number n of detectable photons where n is
characterized by a well-defined probability. It is the fact that the coherent
state is an eigenstate of the field destruction operator that allows it to func-
tion in this way; the repeated absorption of photon(s) from the field does
not change the field state, which is what allows a detectable classical field to
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be sustained. So the photon as a physical entity remains quite meaningful
– even crucial – in the quantum coherent state. A detailed account of the
well-developed theory of coherent states, including experimental verification
of the theoretical predictions for photon detections, is found in [28]. To say
that the “photon idea disappears” just because there is an indeterminate
number of photons in the pre-detection field is at variance with both theory
and experiment on coherent states.
Another aspect of PTI should be mentioned here: recall the point made
in Section 2 concerning the inconsistency of defining an inertial frame of ref-
erence at the quantum level. This problem is remedied under PTI by taking
spacetime as an emergent structure, supervenient on actualized transactions
between quantum level emitters and absorbers. In order to describe this
emergence, PTI takes literally the idea that energy and momentum are the
generators of temporal and spatial displacements, respectively. Thus an ac-
tualized transaction resulting in the transfer from emitter x to absorber y of
a quantum with energy E and momentum p defines a spacetime displacement
((yµ−xµ) that is characterized by an invariant interval. (In the rest frame of
a transferred material quantum, p = 0 and there is zero spatial displacement;
this defines the temporal axis for the particle.)
In addition, macroscopic (classical) objects are distinguished from quan-
tum systems in a well-defined (although inherently probabilistic way): they
are overwhelmingly likely to bring about collapse, since they are huge collec-
tions of potential emitters and/or absorbers ([29], §5 and for a non-technical
presentation see [30], pp 96-106). This makes it virtually impossible to coher-
ently entangle an object like D with a quantum system S such that unitary
evolution is preserved. This is a form of decoherence, but one based on a
physically irreversible process. As such it avoids the circularity problem of
the traditional decoherence program (cf. [31].) Moreover, in this picture, ir-
reversibility arises naturally as a previously unsuspected law of nature; thus
the second law of thermodynamics is explained without having to assume
special low-entropy conditions. For example, thermal interactions are irre-
versible transactions, thus legitimizing Boltzmann’s assumption of “molecu-
lar chaos” in his derivation of his H-theorem.
Since a macroscopic object is a nexus of frequent and persistent transac-
tions giving rise to well-defined spacetime intervals, macroscopic objects can
be described by simultaneous spacetime (x, t) and dynamical (E, P ) descrip-
tions, and as such are clearly distinguished from quantum systems described
by quantum states, which are elements of an underlying substratum. Thus
we have classical phenomena in PTI as well; they are simply a naturally
emergent result rather than a necessary starting point in interpreting the
theory.
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Concerning the matter of contextuality: Bohr was of course correct that
one cannot simultaneously define incompatible quantities when dealing with
quantum systems. In terms of PTI, that is because determinate physical
quantities only obtain as a result of actualized transactions. The latter oc-
cur by way of specific interactions between an OW and its responding CW.
Confirmations define the basis for the measurement, by setting up the ap-
plicable mixed state (for example, two weighted projectors corresponding to
each of two detectors in an interferometer experiment). Only the projec-
tors in that mixed state are eligible for spacetime existence (i.e. as transfers
of detectable energy, momentum, etc.); so quantities corresponding to non-
commuting observables are simply not in play at that point. The CW thus
constitute the physically well-defined “contextuality” that Bohr felt forced
to define only with appeal to final, external observations – “phenomena”.
To emphasize the fact that such contextuality has nothing to do with
macroscopic “phenomena,” an example of a well-defined physical quantity
under PTI is the energy/momentum of a photon emitted from an excited
state atom and absorbed by a ground state atom, regardless of whether that
single photon is ever amplified to the level at which it could in principle be
perceived by a scientist in a laboratory. All the objects involved are quantum
systems, all described by quantum mechanics, and Planck’s constant plays a
crucial role in the interaction. Yet there is an unambiguous interpretation of
the quantum formalism, applying to the degrees of freedom described by the
formalism. No appeal to “the entire experimental arrangement” or necessar-
ily observable “phenomenon” is required for this interpretation. The context
consists of any forces acting on the photon offer wave (i.e., the applicable
Hamiltonian) and the set of advanced absorber responses to the photon of-
fer (the latter being described by the usual forward-propagating quantum
state). The context is entirely physical. The transactional process, which
heralds the advent of classicality (because it confers determinate properties
on the degrees of freedom involved) occurs at a microscopic level, indepen-
dently of whether any particular scientist is able to identify any macroscopic
phenomenon arising from it.
5. Conclusion.
Complementary cannot help us to explain measurement or the nature
of physical reality in a consistent fashion unless we can explain why the
quantum formalism applies correctly to quantum degrees of freedom (such
as the “quantum particle” S in Bohr’s thought experiments with S and D)
but not to macroscopic objects; that is, why the ontic uncertainty of quantum
objects does not “infect” macroscopic objects such as Bohr’s diaphragm D,
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and why we can view the latter’s uncertainty as being epistemic. If we include
absorber response, we have a way forward to make this distinction in physical
terms. Bohr was unable to do this through Complementarity alone, and he
lapsed into instrumentalist and anti-realist utterances as a result.
Recall Bohr’s famous statement that “It is wrong to think that the task of
physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about
nature.”7 Clearly, there is an implicit assumption here: “physics cannot say
how nature is.” But in fact, quantum theory certainly can be telling us “how
nature is.” Why should we presume that nature has to be determinate and
classical at all levels, just because we cannot visualize it “in the ordinary
way”?
Elsewhere in this volume, George Jaroszkiewicz [32] notes that the re-
ductionistic assumptions behind classical physics need to be re-examined,
and that physics is an empirical science. I certainly agree with both points.
However, the fact that physical theory begins by engaging with empirical
phenomena, and must be rigorously tested by experiment, does not negate
the longstanding tradition in physics of theoretical description in terms of
unobservables. Boltzmann’s atomic hypothesis is a prominent example.8 It is
well known that the idea of unobservable atoms was highly controversial, and
that Ernst Mach strongly objected to it on the basis that physics is an em-
pirical science. Yet the atomic hypothesis was clearly the fruitful path, and
it is reasonable to take that theoretical success as evidence for the existence
of atoms, especially now that we can (indirectly) image atoms.
Similarly, it is reasonable to take the success of quantum theory as evi-
dence for the existence of additional structure in nature that gives rise to the
kinds of phenomena predicted by the theory, even if it is difficult (or even
impossible) to visualize this structure “in the ordinary (classical) way.” This
is “inference to the best explanation” for the empirical success of a theory.
The new challenge from quantum theory is that such referents cannot be
classical (i.e., not Einsteinian ‘elements of reality’). But that in itself does
not mean there can be no physical referent for the theory. In contrast, an
instrumentalist, observer-dependent interpretation of quantum theory can
provide no explanation for the success of the theory in predicting (at the sta-
tistical level) our observations. It essentially says that we have a very good
instruction manual for predicting the experiences of an observer, but there
is nothing in the world corresponding to the manual, and/or it is wrong to
think there should be a reason or explanation for its predictive power. Such
7These peremptory sentences followed Bohr’s antirealist statement “There is no quan-
tum world. There is only an abstract quantum mechanical description.”
8Faraday’s “lines of force” is another.
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an attitude would appear to be based on the assumption that if the expla-
nation is not classical in nature (i.e. not in terms of determinate spacetime
objects), there can be no explanation. But why should we demand that
the explanation behind the success of quantum theory be classical? That
expectation, I suggest, is what needs to be given up.9
Finally, the proposed PTI picture of an intrinsically unobservable, pre-
spacetime quantum substratum giving rise to an empirical, classically de-
terminate realm of experience may seem startling, even farfetched. But it
does provide a clear physical referent for the quantum formalism (at least
in a structural sense, [33, 34]), and a well-defined basis for the emergence
of classical determinacy – describable by classical physics – from that for-
malism. In that regard, I have noted elsewhere ( [21], Chapter 7) that the
PTI ontology provides a natural correspondence for Kantian “noumenon” as
describing the quantum level and “phenomenon” as describing the classical
level. Here it is advisable to recall again McMullin’s observation that the
structures of the microworld are not required to be “imaginable in the cate-
gories of the macroworld.” And as Bohr himself commented in a remark to
Pauli, it might just be “crazy enough to be true.”10
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9Of course, the disagreement between instrumentalists and realists can also be under-
stood as a disagreement about the nature of scientific inquiry and explanation. Mach
argued for a limited descriptive role for physical theory, and considered matters of ontol-
ogy as strictly outside the domain of physics. However, such a methodological limitation
on the discipline of physics does not preclude reasonable ontological inferences based on
the success of physical theory, whether or not one considers such inferences as within the
proper purview of physics. And such ontological inferences may even prove fruitful in con-
structing new theories or in resolving anomalies or other remaining challenges in physics.
This situation illustrates the ongoing fundamental dependence of physics on philosophy.
10Bohr’s famous remark concerning a theory by Pauli, as quoted in [35].
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